GOD AS FIRST PRINCIPLE AND METAPHYSICS AS A SCIENCE

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In Aristotelian "first philosophy" (protè philosophia), wisdom is defined as the search for first causes and first principles. Thus, first philosophy is defined as the highest, governing science, even before its object has been determined, i.e. before knowing the precise number and the nature of these first principles, whether nature (phusis), being (to on), God, or, as Aristotle himself is inclined to think in Metaphysics VII (Z), ousia.

The very claim that God is first principle – if such a principle exists – emerged in the field of philosophy. Before Aristotle, Anaxagoras had already characterized the nous as divine. Further, as we have seen, the question of the nature and existence of a first principle is a crucial one for determining the status of the "highest science" for which Aristotle was looking in the Metaphysics. In a situation like this, a confrontation with the doctrine of the great revealed religions was unavoidable. This began in the period of the Alexandrian commentaries, continued in the Arabo-islamic world, and the Latin Middle Ages inherited this rich and complex tradition. In fact, for a long time, medieval Latin thinkers believed that Aristotle had written a theology, supposedly the continuation of Book XII of the Metaphysics. They thought that this was to be found in the small text derived from Proclus' Elements of Theology and entitled Liber de causis.

Does the investigation of the natural world allow us to conclude the existence of a first principle? Following natural reason, what might prompt us to call this principle 'God'? In the highest part of philosophy, what functions does God as first principle play? Are we talking about the same God as the God of the Bible, or is this pure homonymy?

In the first part of this paper I sketch the thirteenth and fourteenth century debate concerning the object of metaphysics, which raised the question of whether God, insofar as he is first principle, is the object of this

1 Metaphysics, A, 1, 981 b 27-28: "All men suppose what is called wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things" (trans. Aristotle 1984, vol. II. 1553).

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science. Then I investigate how the first principle can be apprehended and conceived as an integral part of a discipline that proceeds according to human reason. I consequently touch on how the question of the knowability of the first principle serves simultaneously to assign the limits of metaphysics and to determine fully the extent of its validity. Finally I show that Early Modern metaphysics, specifically René Descartes, while completely abandoning the peripatetic conception of knowledge prevalent in the Middle Ages, nevertheless retains certain aspects of the medieval tradition through the use that Descartes made of a philosophical conception of God that provided a foundation for the order of nature and guaranteed our knowledge.

1. METAPHYSICS AS A SCIENCE OF THE DIVINE

Is metaphysics the science of the divine, that is to say, is God the object of the science of metaphysics and, if so, how? At the end of the twelfth century, Latin scholars discovered three sets of texts from the Greek and Arabic worlds that would play a decisive role in the development of medieval metaphysics and especially in the discussion of whether God as first principle is the object of metaphysics: the texts of Aristotle known since the time of Andronicus of Rhodes as the *Metaphysics*; Avicenna’s own *Metaphysics*, known as the *Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*; and Averroes’ commentaries on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. From this point on, the term ‘metaphysics’ will be used to designate the discipline looking for first causes and first principles. It is well known that Aristotle had rejected any infinite causal regress; following up on this point, medieval scholars think necessary, also from a strictly rational or philosophical point of view, the existence of a first cause that is not caused, an ultimate cause of everything in the universe that could guarantee its order. This first principle, in both the Christian and the Arabo-islamic world, was of course called ‘God’.

This is not surprising: Aristotle himself considered first philosophy to be a divine science – in fact, in two ways. First, only God can perfectly have that science; second, the science has the divine as its object. The idea of “divine science”, initially conveyed by the title of the Latin translation

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*See Metaphysic’s, A, 2, 983 a 6-9: “... and this science alone is, in two ways, most divine. For the science which it would be most meet for God to have is a divine science, and so is any science that deals with divine objects; and this science alone has both these qualities: for God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others.” (trans. Aristotle 1984, vol. II, 1555).*
of Avicenna’s *Metaphysics* (*Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina*), is also supported by Averroes’ commentary. There, metaphysics is characterized as “ousiology” (the science of substance as substance), thus conferring a special position on God as immaterial substance, formal and final cause of all other substances. This interpretation is not unfaithful to Aristotle, who (explicitly contradicting “materialists”, holding that all principles are subject to movement), claimed that substance can be not only mobile and corruptible but also immobile and eternal, and who called the first of the theoretical sciences ‘theology’ (*Metaphysics*, E, I, 1026a 10-12).

It is not to be wondered at, then, that the most independent masters of the faculty of arts at the later medieval university admit the idea that metaphysics, the superior part of philosophy, is a science that deals with the divine. For example, John Buridan (d. after 1358), in Book I of his *Questions on the Metaphysics*, examining whether metaphysics is the highest science and whether it is the same as wisdom, maintains just this:

Sed sapientia, secundum Aristotelem, non est aliud quam ipsa metaphysica, quae considerat causas altissimas, scilicet Deum et intelligentias, et etiam considerat prima principia doctrinae communissima. (John Buridan 1588, lib. I, q. 1, f. IIIr)

And, in the following question:

Sic enim Aristoteles metaphysicam vocat theologiam et scientiam divinam;

Concerning these two disciplines, then:

utraque considerat de deo et de divinis. (John Buridan 1588, I, q. 2, f. IIIr)

Of course, one must emphasize the Aristotelian style of Buridan’s formulations: for one thing, Buridan speaks of the *divine* (neuter noun) rather than of God, and in Aristotle, with the exception of some exoteric expressions, we find only rarely a personal God; in addition, Buridan repeats the set phrase “God and the Intelligences”. But the clear Aristotelian tone and wording is not merely Buridan’s concession to the fact that he is commenting on an Aristotelian text; rather Buridan is developing for its own sake the peripatetic cosmic-theology found in Book XII of the *Metaphysics*.

If “first philosophy” is a divine science, then is God not the first principle of being and thought, and consequently the main object of the “investigated science”? We find here the line of questioning that most modern-day

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commentators take up: whether metaphysics is ontology or theology, or more generally whether metaphysics is an onto-theological structure. Although this line of questioning is definitely to be found in medieval metaphysics, it is certainly not a constant feature of it. In fact, it has been pointed out (e.g., Libera 1989, 72-73) that this is an interpretation of metaphysics that we find at a specific point in the history of Latin philosophy, and one that is based on a conception of being that stems from the doctrine of Avicenna (and al-Farabi).

In the beginning of his Questions on the Metaphysics, John Duns Scotus (d. 1308) examines what the highest and most desirable science is (John Duns Scotus 1997). In the Prologue, his answer seems clear: the object of the highest science is ens inquantum ens. Scotus briefly justifies his view through some arguments found in Avicenna, which are intended to show that being is the first object of the intellect. Scotus is here opposing not Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), but Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), for whom God is the first object of intellect. But in question I of his treatise, Scotus continues his investigation in a form that will become canonical: what is the "object" of metaphysics – that is to say, what is metaphysics about – and further what is discovered through the examination of this object's properties? Scotus summarizes the question of the object of metaphysics in a way that will become classic in the interpretation of metaphysics as onto-theology, setting in opposition the ideas of two of Aristotle's interpreters, Avicenna and Averroes:  

Utrum subjectum metaphysicæ sit ens inquantum ens sicut posuit Avicenna vel Deus et intelligentiae sicut posuit Avernoes.

The innovative form of this statement has its roots in Scotus’ position on the univocality of the concept of being: Scotus holds that all being – infinite as well as finite – is grasped by one concept. Thus, the question arises of whether God is included under this common concept.  

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1 This line of reasoning is, as Heidegger pointed out, circular with reference to two starting points: on the one hand, a science of being as being ought to be founded upon some first being; on the other hand, the idea of a first and most eminent being already presupposes a conception of being. See Heidegger 1957, and further Marion 1995 and Boulnois 1995.

2 John Duns Scotus 1997, 15-72. Scotus is not the first to employ this type of scheme. We find in the Questions in Metaphysicæ of Siger of Brabant (d. 1284), for example, a similar contrast between the ideas of Avicenna and Avernoes on the subject of metaphysics; cf. Siger of Brabant 1983: C, book I, q. 1, pp. 23-25, and P, Introd., pp. 395-97. In Siger, however, the opposition is presented only briefly, while Scotus elaborates on it greatly.

3 The literature on Scotus’ conception of metaphysics and the univocal concept of being is vast. See, in addition to Honnefelder’s contribution to this volume and the literature referred to there, Boulnois 1990b, esp. ch. 5; Dumont 1998, and several of the contributions
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In Scotus’ presentation, Averroes appears as the one who clearly considers God and the separate substances to be the first object of metaphysics (John Duns Scotus 1997, 19):

Una <positio> est Commentatoris, scilicet quod substantiae separatae, scilicet Deus et intelligentiae, sunt hic subiectum.

The idea of “separate substances” refers to a central passage in Metaphysics VI, chapter 1, concerning the division of the theoretical sciences, where Aristotle says that if the divine is present anywhere, it is in this immobile and separate nature (cf. Metaphysics, E, 1, 1026 a 19). But Book XII introduced, together with the first unmoved mover, celestial intelligences. Arabic thinkers, especially al-Kindi and al-Farabi, gave these celestial intelligences a decisive function both in noetics and in cosmology.

The idea that God is, in some way, an object of metaphysics will find general acceptance. But whether God is the first and proper object, or merely one of several, is an issue that would prompt a great deal of discussion.7

Averroes considered metaphysics to be the science of unmoved and separate substances. But, according to the requirements of Aristotelian epistemology, for metaphysics to be a science the existence of its object must be presupposed. Thus, Averroes held that metaphysics can deal with God because his existence had already been proven, specifically in books VII and VIII of the Physics, where God’s existence had been demonstrated by appeal to his role as first mover of the universe. As a result, in Averroes’ system God appears mainly as the first mover or as the first principle, i.e. the final cause of the universe, a universe that itself is ordered according to a hierarchy of intelligences (i.e. separate substances; see Averroes, Metaphysica XII in Averroes 1550-1562, vol. VIII).

Scotus, basing himself upon Avicenna, rejects this conception. His first criticism is that in metaphysics the existence of God is not presupposed, but, quite to the contrary, investigated. God is an object of metaphysical research, and thus in metaphysics it is necessary for us to prove God’s existence and to investigate God’s properties. A second criticism is perhaps more fundamental: Averroes’ proof for the existence of a first principle has

in Honnefelder, Wood, and Dreyer 1996 (including Bouhnois 1996) and in Sondag 1999 (including Bouhnois 1999a)

7 It is interesting that Siger of Brabant, often considered to be an adherent of a radical Aristotelianism, hesitates on this point: “Medium autem quo Deus ostenditur naturale est, quo Aristoteles utitur XII” husus, quasi hoc supponens ex physica. Sed si ratio subjecti debet esse universalis, tunc Deus non debet dici subjectum huius scientiae. quia per se accidetna quaei debet in scientia” (Siger of Brabant 1983, I, 1, p. 25).
implicit in it a sort of divine necessitarianism, since without this we could not use movement to demonstrate God’s existence. Scotus argues that Averroes’ proof entails God’s acting necessarily in a certain way. Unlike Averroes, and following Avicenna, Scotus emphasizes contingency and God’s ultimate freedom, and Scotus contrasts the free creation of the world by God with the relation between the mover and the moved, which is normally necessary. The physical world can give us only clues, and on the basis of these clues we can conduct our study of God. In what science should this study be undertaken? According to Scotus, in metaphysics. In contrast, as we have seen, an Aristotelian-averroist position holds that God is not the first object of metaphysics, since God’s existence and its proof are already presupposed.

For Avicenna, and following him, Scotus, the first object of metaphysics is being as being (ens inquantum ens). From this starting point, especially with Francisco Suárez (d. 1617) writing at the end of the sixteenth century, metaphysics will evolve into what will come to be called a “general ontology”. According to Suárez, the proper object of metaphysics is in fact ens reale, that is to say actual or possible being; but his univocal concept of being opens up the possibility of a general ontology with a most common, first object. Of course, God cannot be this most common object, since the concepts of cause and caused, principle or princípatum, are disjunctive transcendentals, falling under the concept of being, whether that being is finite or infinite. God is not the first object, even if he is, in some respects, a privileged object of consideration. Because metaphysics is the science of being as being, it is also the science of the first being, i.e. of the eminent being that is God, but only indirectly by way of induction, since through metaphysics we cannot comprehend God’s essence – as we shall see, metaphysics only grasps God as infinite being.8

2. WHAT CONCEPTS OF GOD CAN WE ATTAIN?

If, as we have just seen, there is a lively medieval discussion concerning the way in which God as first principle is the object of the science of metaphysics, a further issue that is raised is how we should characterize this God who is first principle. The God of Aristotle is fundamentally the first mover who moves the celestial spheres and the cosmos as the object of desire (Metaphysics, A, 7). We are not dealing here with the personal and

8 See Suárez, Disputaciones metaphysicae I, sect. 1 in Suárez 1856-1877, vol. XXV. On Suárez’ conception of metaphysics, see, in addition to Honnefelder’s contribution to this volume and the literature referred to there: Courtine 1990 and Boulnois 1999b, ch. 9.
mysterious God of the Bible. Augustine had already noticed that it was impossible to fully reconcile Holy Scripture and the books of the Platonists: in the latter he read that in the beginning was the Word (Logos), but not that the Word became Flesh to redeem the world (Augustine, Confessiones, Bk. VII, IX, 13).

What clear, rational concepts can metaphysics produce about God?

Let us look briefly at some examples of medieval conceptions of God as first principle. It is not surprising that the medieval artizae, claiming to follow a purely philosophical way of thinking, adopt the idea of the first, unmoved mover. According to Averroes, proof that a first principle exists as first mover is the highest point of physics, and one of the tasks of metaphysics is to generate knowledge about that principle.

Thus, in John Buridan’s Questions on the Metaphysics, the questions dealing with Book XII examine in detail God as first mover. Question 4 asks “whether the first mover is absolutely simple”. Here we find the term ‘God’ assimilated to purely philosophical concepts: “Supponamus in ista quod primus motor est prima causa, et primum ens, scilicet ipse deus” (John Buridan 1588, XII, q. 4, f. LXVI°). That God is the ultimate end of the universe – understood as the end prima intentione – had been indicated in a previous question dedicated to final causality (John Buridan 1588, II, q. 3, f. X°). But when in question 5 of book XII he returns to the relation between efficient and final causality in an intelligence that moves other things, Buridan summarizes (John Buridan 1588, XII, q. 5, f. LXVII°):

finis assimilatiois vocatur cui agens vel passum intendit assimilari; et sic deus est causa finalis omnium aliorum. Unde omnia naturalia agentia finaliter ad hoc agunt ut quantum possunt assimilari ipsi deo.

Of course, to completely comprehend the philosophical meaning of this passage, we should take into account the Buridianian theory of efficient and final causality, in which God appears everywhere as the foundation of the natural order. Here it is sufficient to stress that this doctrine, emerging from a strictly philosophical point of view, with all theological motivations set aside, proposes a God whose function is to support a cosmological vision, to guarantee the coherence and order of the universe through a combination of the notions of mover, efficient cause, and final cause.

The artizae are not the only ones who took a purely natural approach when elaborating a metaphysical concept of God. Some doctors in theology, including Thomas Aquinas, had already followed the same path to a certain extent.

In his Summa contra gentiles. Aquinas admits that some truths about God pertain to philosophy (Thomas Aquinas 1918, I, c. 3, p. 7):
We reach the first principle by starting from sense data and using our natural reason. A consequence of this is that, although we cannot reach an understanding of his "substance", we can nevertheless obtain some truths about God (Thomas Aquinas 1918, I, c. 3, p. 8):

Ducitur tamen ex sensibilibus intellectus noster in divinam cogitationem ut cognoscat de Deo quia est, et alia huissouad quae oportet attribui primo principio.

Metaphysics has *ens commune* as its object, but it is possible to go from *ens* to *causa essendi*. The main aspects of Thomas' doctrine are well known. In *Summa contra gentiles* (Thomas Aquinas 1918, I, c. 13, pp. 30-34), Aquinas gives five arguments by which "philosophers as well as Catholic doctors have proven that God exists". These five demonstrative ways overlap to a certain degree with the *quinque viae* of the *Summa theologicae*, that demonstrate the existence of God by effects in the created world – since a knowledge according to causes is impossible in this case.⁴

In *Summa contra gentiles*, the three first ways of demonstrating God's existence rely upon the Aristotelian concept of the first mover. The first of these ways repeats Aristotle's line of reasoning as found in *Physics* VII, starting from the axiom "all that is moved is moved by something else" combined with the impossibility of an infinite causal regress. The second one takes its starting point in Aristotle's discussion in *Physics* VIII and introduces considerations about contingency and necessity. The third one, referring to *Metaphysics* II, is based on efficient causality, and the fourth, referring to the same book of the *Metaphysics*, is founded upon eminence. Only the fifth way, based on providence and quoting John Damascene, is explicitly theological in nature. These five ways establish that God exists, and they do this by proposing a concept of first principle deduced from "natural" phenomena, either from its effects or from concepts that apply to the universe in general.

Are we to say that this natural way of thinking shows that God exists but that it does not allow us to understand his essence? The negative or dialectic elements of Aquinas' doctrine could incline us to think this, and yet we cannot be satisfied with this dichotomy. This is because in God,

⁴ See *Summa theologicae*, 1a pars. q. 2, art. 2 for the sort of demonstration that is attainable here, and art. 3 for the "five ways"; the literature is vast, but see, e.g., Gilson 1997, 67-97.
being and essence are identical, as we read in chapter 22 of Summa contra gentiles (Thomas Aquinas, 1918, I, c. 22, p. 68):

In Deo non est aliud essentia vel quidditas quam suum esse.

I will not summarize here the well known theory of analogical attribution, by which Aquinas expounds the conditions of discourse about God (see, e.g., Gilson 1997, 121-29). I must, however, emphasize two fundamental points in Aquinas’ treatment. First, it is possible using natural reason alone to go from being in general (the ens commune of the Prologue to the Questions on The Metaphysics; Thomas Aquinas 1950, Prooemium, pp. 1-2) to the cause, not of a particular being, but of being in general, i.e. to the causa essendi (De ente et essentia, c. 4, in Thomas Aquinas 1976, p. 377a, ll. 139-42):

Oportet quod sit aliqua res quae sit causa essendi omnibus rebus eo quod ipsa est esse tanti; alias iretur in infinitum in causis.

We can reason from being in general, or from being as being, to the principle of being. Second, “Esse actum quemdam nominat” (Thomas Aquinas 1918, I, c. 22, p. 68). God is not in potency; he is pure act, and that is why in him there is no dichotomy between the act of being and what he is.

So we can, philosophically, reach the concept of the first being, who is pure being (a primo ente quod est esse tantum), pure act (actus purus), and the cause of all other being (causa essendi). According to Aquinas himself, that we can do this is a conceptual requirement, that is the cornerstone of a system elaborated through natural reason.

Not every theologian, however, agrees with peripatetic metaphysics to this extent. In the Prologue to his Lectura in librum primum Sententiarum (Prologus, pars 1, q. un., in John Duns Scotus 1950-, vol. XVI, 5), Duns Scotus, the other major authority in many late-medieval schools, stresses that philosophy alone does not enable us to come to an understanding of God as first principle: we need revelation. Scotus accuses philosophers of believing that the intellect can obtain all necessary knowledge on the basis of natural things (ex naturalibus). For Scotus himself, on the other hand, revelation does not exist only for the perfection of wisdom, it is essential to it, and metaphysics cannot succeed in grasping the quidditative nature (ratio) of its objects (Lectura in l Sent., Prol., pars 1, q. un., in John Duns Scotus 1950-, vol. XVI, 18):

Item dico (...) quod licet scientiae naturales, quae numerantur in VI Metaphysicae, sint de omnibus subjectis speculabilibus, non tamen de ciss secundum rationem quidditativam
eorum, nec per consequens de passionibus illorum propriis secundum rationem propriam et quidditatvim istorum, sicut patet de angelis in metaphysica.

However, in the discipline of metaphysics, taken as the science of being as such, there can be a doctrine of a pre-eminent being, called ‘God’. In his Tractatus de primo principio, generally considered to be one of his later works, Scotus sets out to explain what knowledge of God’s true being we can attain through unaided natural reason.\textsuperscript{10} Scotus claims that the first principle can be considered first in three different ways: it can be the first agent (efficient causality), the ultimate end (final causality), or the first thing in terms of eminence (i.e. the ordered relation between what is more or less noble with respect to essence). In a typically peripatetic fashion, Scotus rejects the possibility of an infinite causal regress.\textsuperscript{11} For each of these three orders — that of efficient causes, that of final causes, and that of eminence — reason can show that there is some first, unique being; further, reason can show that these three first beings (one for each of the three orders) coincide in one and the same unique nature, uncaused and fully actualized.\textsuperscript{12}

There is indeed a place in Scotus’ metaphysics for a theory of the first principle, and this proceeds by way of demonstration. But these demonstrations do not completely live up to the requirements of scientific knowledge, and here is an important difference between Scotus and Aquinas. According to Scotus, true scientific knowledge of the first being would have to be deductive. Yet the unaided natural faculties of the homo viator cannot grasp the divine essence. A true science of God, then, is not a part of philosophy, but of theology, and moreover not of theology for us in this life but of theology in itself (theology pro nobis as opposed to in se). This is because philosophy ascends from effects to causes, and along the series of causes up to the first cause, which is the foundation of the essential order of causes. So, for Scotus, there can be no demonstrative science of God as first principle, which is a part of metaphysics and which shows the causes of the properties attributed to this first principle. As we have noted, the peripatetic arrangement, leading from physics to metaphysics as divine science, is ruled out by Scotus’ fundamental thesis of the contingency of divine willing:

Primum causans, quidquid causat, contingenter causat.\textsuperscript{13}

\textsuperscript{10} See Tractatus de primo principio. c. 1, § [1], in John Duns Scotus 2001, 76: ‘‘... inquirere ad quantum cognitionem de veroesse, quod tu es, possit pertingere nostra ratio naturalis...’’

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., chap. 3, § [27], in John Duns Scotus 2001, 108.


\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., chap. 4, § [59]. John Duns Scotus 2001, 150. See also Ghisalberti 1999.
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Thus, for Scotus, the first principle is not essentially the first mover, nor the *causa asseendi*; rather it is infinite being. The concept of infinite being is the most simple and most perfect concept that the human intellect can attain. As Scotus writes (*Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1-2, in John Duns Scotus 1950-, vol. III, 40):

Concepius perfectior simul et simplicior nobis possibilitis est conceptus entis infiniti (...) quia "infinitum" non est quas attributum vel passio entis, sive eius de quo dicitur, sed dictum medium intrinsecum illius entitatis, ut quod cum dico "infinitum ens", non habeo conceptum quasi per accidentes, ex subiecto et passione, sed conceptum per se subjectum in certo gradu perfectionis, scilicet infinitatis.

Through such an approach to the first and most eminent being, Scotus extends the teaching of Henry of Ghent, for whom God was understood in terms of his formal *ratio* of infinity.¹⁴ God himself, in terms of this *ratio* of infinity, is the object of God’s own knowledge, as well as the object of the knowledge of the angels and of the *viator*. But, according to Henry, there are various ways in which infinity can serve as the object of a science. In one way, the intellect apprehends the thing itself and the *ratio infinitatis* so that the object of the science is grasped totally in its substance and its nature as an infinite object; God alone can understand himself as infinite in this way. In another way, God is understood in his substance, but not totally, “since not in terms of the *ratio* of infinity; since although they apprehend that this is in God, they do not apprehend what this is” (Henry of Ghent 1987, 8). Here we find in outline an idea that will survive until the time of Descartes: that the infinite eludes the full comprehension of human understanding, though it is grasped in some way.

Scotus enumerates the ways by which we can reach by natural means the concept of infinite being. In the *Tractatus de primo principio*, for example, he gives seven ways which prove the infinity of the first being; three of these rely on the intellect, the fourth on the simplicity of the essence, the three others use eminence, final causality, and efficient causality.¹⁵ If the existence of an actual infinite being is not known in-and-of itself (*per se*) by our intellect in its present state, nevertheless, as we have seen, we can demonstrate that of necessity some first thing exists in the orders of efficient and final cause, and of eminence (*Ordinatio* I, d. 2, pars 1, q. 1-2, nn. 41-43, in: John Duns Scotus 1950-, vol. II, 149-52). First, we demonstrate that there actually exists some absolutely first being in each of these three orders, efficient causality, final causality, and eminence; then we demonstrate that the first being that each of these three ways leads us to must be the very same being; and finally we demonstrate

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¹⁴ See *Quod*: XII, q. 1, Henry of Ghent 1987, 5-6.
¹⁵ See ch. 4, 9th concl., §§ [67] to [82].
that this being is unique (see Boulnois 1999a). As to the actual infinity of this being, this can be demonstrated by again resorting to the primacy that this first being has: actual infinity is entailed by the primacy of efficient causality, of exemplar knowledge (since that first efficient cause must distinctly know all that it can do), of the ultimate end, and (in a reelaboration and a “coloratio” of the Anselmian argument) of the most eminent being that necessarily exists (Ordinatio, I, d. 2, pars 1, qqs. 1-2, nn. 137-39, in John Duns Scotus 1950-, vol. II, 208-11).

Indeed, Scotus is subsuming the concept of the first principle under that of being. Moreover, by giving the concept of the infinite the central role in metaphysics and by demonstrating the actual infinity of the first being, Scotus gives the concept of the infinite a philosophical dignity that Aquinas had denied it. The centrality of the infinite is something that we will find again in the philosophical debates of the seventeenth century.

But the complete understanding of the infinite is nevertheless beyond the reach of the finite human mind according to Scotus (and with this Descartes will be in agreement). Chapter 4 of Tractatus de primo principio culminates in the ninth thesis: “Te esse infinitum et incomprehensibilem a finito”. Thus, the metaphysics of the viator is inherently limited. The first principle can be rationally thought, but the nature of the infinite, which is the highest concept reached by natural reason and which is equivalent to the divine essence, is incomprehensible. For Scotus, theology for us in this life must rely on revelation in order to investigate an infinite God.

Whether God is considered to be the causa essendi or the ens infinitum, in either case metaphysics is constructed upon the concept of being. But with its Neoplatonic heritage, medieval thought could also have taken God, understood as first principle, to be beyond or outside of being. If this approach is apparently more in conformity with Christian revelation, nevertheless as early as the Hellenistic period it generates what we can call a “metaphysics of the One”, which produces a distinct tradition, and furthermore which influences many authors and surfaces in the issue of whether the divine attributes can be homonymic with the corresponding created attributes. The result will be the position that the first principle cannot be described or comprehended in terms of the categories of being. Latin scholars found this idea in the De divinis nominibus attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite and known in the West as early as the ninth century in the translation of John Scotus Eriugena. God is “the cause of all being, which is itself no being, since it transcends superessentially every creature”. For Ps-Dionysius, the first name of God is the Good. The roots

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11 Cf. De divinis nominibus, cap. 1 in Dionysius Areopagita 1857, col. 593-94c.
of this tradition are to be found in the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and
Proclus. God is the One, which is more primary than the Good, which in
turn is more primary than Being (See Magnard 1992, chapters VII and
VIII). The One is not itself being, but the generator of being.\(^8\) Being is
generated by the One during the process in which the One becomes many.
Commented upon by several medieval thinkers – among them Aquinas –
Ps-Dionysius’ treatise influenced many authors until the time of the
Renaissance, and it played an important role in the doctrine of Nicholas of
Cusa (d. 1464). According to Ps-Dionysius, it is principally through
negative attributes that we can grasp superessential divinity.

According to Meister Eckhart (d. 1328) – one of the more prominent
medieval theologians influenced by the Dionysian current – the first
principle cannot be grasped on the basis of its being, but on the basis of its
understanding (intelligere). God is not pure act of being, but rather ipsum
intelligere.\(^9\) In developing a negative and analogical theology, Eckhart
views creatures as signs, and considers the union of thought with the first
principle as “de-realization” or “becoming nothing”. It is not surprising
that such ideas border on mysticism. According to Eckhart, however, there
is a place for some kind of metaphysics (Libera 1980, 40-63; Libera 1999).
Nevertheless, the first principle is not the most eminent being; rather it is
fundamentally intellect, as Latin theologians could have read in many
Arabic philosophers, an intellect which cannot be understood to be in the
categories of being.

3. THE KNOWABILITY OF GOD AND THE LIMITS OF
METAPHYSICS

Whether God is considered to be the most eminent being, the cause of
being, or even the first principle beyond being, no philosophical or
theological enterprise can avoid asking to what extent human reason can
grasp him. The problem of reconciling the simplicity of the divine essence

\(^8\) Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, II. 2, 1 in Plotinus 1931, vol. V, 28, Magnard 1992, 102-103,
shows that even with Damascene, who considers the infinitive ‘to be’ (einaí) and not only
the participle ‘being’ (to on). Being is a second principle, coming after the One. In the In
Parmeniadmin, on the other hand, Porphyry identifies the One with ‘to be’ (einaí), which is
prior to ‘being’ (to on): In Parmeniadmin, XX, 25-35 (quoted according to Magnard 1992,
115).

\(^9\) Of course, that God is his intellection is an idea found throughout medieval
philosophy (see e.g. Thomas Aquinas 1918, I. c. 45, p. 136: “Quod intelligere Dei est sua
essentia”). On the other hand, Eckhart does not deny that God is ipsum esse, but the relative
importance of these concepts in the determination of the essence of the first principle is
reversed.
and the plurality of attributes is the *locus classicus* for the investigation of *predicatio in divinis*, the question of the univocity, equivocity, or analogy of predicates.

There is a tradition running from Proclus to Nicholas of Cusa, including Ps-Dionysius, Scotus, and Meister Eckhart, which questions the possibility of applying to God natural concepts and the categories of being; indeed it questions whether God can be named at all. But the supporters of a negative dialectic are not alone in considering the first principle to be impossible to reach: the opinion that only the face-to-face vision of God will allow the *viator* to grasp and enjoy the divine essence is a commonplace in Christian thought. Thus, there is a limitation on our ability to grasp the first principle by natural means.

According to Scotus, as we have seen, in this life we cannot obtain a direct knowledge of the divine essence, although this would be necessary in order to have a scientific knowledge of the first principle. A similar attitude is the starting point for the theory that William of Ockham (d. 1347) holds concerning the knowledge human beings can possess about God. Since the divine essence cannot be grasped directly, it cannot be the point of departure for quidditative attributions in evident propositions. When dealing with the divine attributes, then, Ockham emphasizes divine simplicity to such an extent that he rejects any distinction (and particularly any formal distinction) between essence and attributes. But through a semiological interpretation of the divine attributes, Ockham elaborates a theory of the modes of conceiving and signifying God. We can indeed construct a proper concept of God, but not a simple concept that could directly refer to its significate. We compose complex concepts of God from diverse concepts we obtain from things in the created world. Some attributes are common to God and creatures, and as a result must be predicated univocally, at least when taken *in abstracto* – even if we must remember that a term like ‘wisdom’ refers to the divine essence itself, which is not the substrate of any distinct quality or form. Other concepts are relative or connotative, such as ‘creator’; still others negative, such as ‘infinite’ – in contrast to Scotus, Ockham holds that, since this is a negative concept, it cannot be the best quidditative concept to express the divine

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20 For more on this point, see esp. § 2 of Friedman’s contribution to this volume.


22 See *Quodlibeta* II, q. 4, in *William of Ockham 1967-1986*, vol. 11, 123-24, with reference to Anselm’s *Monologion*, cap. 16 (in *Anselmus Cantuariensis 1946-1961*, vol. 1, 30) where Anselm says that ‘justus’ is not predicated in the same way of God and of human beings.
GOD AS FIRST PRINCIPLE

essence. William of Ockham, then, reconsiders the ancient question of the divine names, but with the help of his logic and semiotics, he is led to conclusions very different from the negative theology of Ps-Dionysius. On the other hand, Ockham does sharply reduce the number of propositions that can be demonstrated in theology, though he admits that some of these truths can be apprehended by reason as probable propositions, the objects of persuasive argumentation. For Ockham, the need for the direct and immediate grasp of the thing is at the heart of the formation of concepts, but we have no intuitive cognition of God. Ockham’s aim is not to lay the foundations for a metaphysics that would advance and defend a philosophical conception of God – such a preoccupation is foreign to him. He seeks to evaluate the reach of theological propositions used by theologians. For example, the proposition ‘God exists’ is not the object of demonstrative knowledge, but can nevertheless be the object of a certain natural knowledge, given the meaning of the subject term ‘God’.

Several different approaches will be taken by thinkers attempting to secure a function for some form of natural theology. To a certain extent this can already be seen in Thomas Aquinas. We have already noted that Aquinas contrasts Sacred Doctrine, based upon revelation, with the “theology of the philosophers”, a set of truths about God, his existence, creation, and even some aspects of his essence, which can be reached by reason and are confirmed by the faith. What can be designated as “natural theology” is a part of philosophy, since, for Thomas, someone is a philosopher not because he comments on philosophical texts or wrestles with purely philosophical problems, but because he employs exclusively natural reason in his pursuit of knowledge (see Kretzmann 1997 and 1999, esp. 1997, chap. 1, pp. 23-52).

John Buridan, a master of arts, replies in the affirmative to the question of whether we can know God considered as first cause or first principle. He deals with the question in his commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. II, q. 3, where he cites and criticizes “beatus Thomas”.

First, Buridan is careful to stress that he is not investigating the issue of the post mortem intellection of God, since this does not concern

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philosophy. Buridan’s question is whether God as first cause and as ultimate end can be known *naturaliter in ista vita* (John Buridan 1588, II, q. 3, f. X⁶):

ipsum deumpossimus intelligere primo et ipso habere scientiam demonstrativam, quia in duodecimo huius multae conclusiones demonstratur ubi termini supponunt pro ipso deo, et hoc est de ipso deo habere scientiam demonstrativam.

But we must still determine in what way we know him, i.e. what sort of knowledge we have about him, and it is here that Buridan opposes Aquinas. According to Buridan, Aquinas would support two statements. The first is that we know that God exists ("quantum ad si est vel quia est vel quantum ad suum esse"), and this seems to be "admitted by everyone". The second statement is that "Deum non possimus intelligere quantum ad suum quidditatem" (John Buridan 1588, II, q. 3, f. X⁶). The arguments that Buridan gives for Aquinas’ position are based principally upon the impossibility of an *a priori* knowledge of God. But Buridan rejects the arguments that he attributes to Thomas (John Buridan 1588, II, q. 3, f. X⁶).

Et iste sunt rationes beat Thome quibus non obstantibus credo quod quidditatem Dei nos possimus intelligere, quia quidditas ipsius nihil alium est quam ipsum dei.

Buridan seeks to use against Aquinas the idea that being and essence in God are identical. Thus, we cannot say that we understand that God exists unless we also understand what God is. Is it fair to say that such criticism is superficial and unjust? Surely. But it can bring to mind a few sentences from Aquinas’ *Summa contra gentiles* (Thomas Aquinas 1918, I, c. 3, § 3, p. 8):

Nam ad substantiam <Dei> capienda intellectus humanus naturali virtute pertinere non potest, cum intellectus nostri, secundum modum praeeremis vitae, cognitio a sensu incipiat, et ideo ea quae in sensu non cadunt, non possunt humano intellectu capi, nisi quatenus ex sensibilibus earum cognitio colligitur.

A demonstration from effects allows us to recognize the existence of the cause, but it does not give us knowledge of the essence. The knowledge we have about God by natural reason “non sunt articuli fidei sed praebambula ad articulos” (*Summa theologiae*, I, q. 2, art. 2).

Buridan affirms that we can indeed predicate quidditative concepts of God. Should we perhaps limit this in some way? For example, it might be the case – as William of Ockham holds – that we possess no simple concepts suppositing exclusively for God, but only complex concepts, such as that of *primum ens*, first being, or that of *prima causa omnium*, first cause of all things. Such a position would indeed lead to some certain knowledge of the first principle; yet, for Buridan, it is not sufficient. To
make his point, Buridan considers intellectual cognition of material substances. According to him, a substance is always understood through its accidents, which can be grasped only through the senses; nevertheless we obtain a simple concept of the substance. There is on this point a fundamental difference between Buridan’s nectics and those of Scotus or Ockham, which are founded upon the intellectual intuition of the singular, which in turn requires a most basic acquaintance with the thing signified. In the latter case, we can conceive something of which we do not have intuitive cognition (e.g., God or matter), but only through complex concepts. With Buridan, on the other hand, it seems that the cognition of a substance produces a simple concept through a unique intellectual act, even if it has not been grasped by the intellect or the senses in a most basic acquaintance. For Buridan, this is also the case with God:

ex istis inferioribus ascendimus ad cognitionem Dei, et secundum convenientiam vel disconvenientiam attribuimus ipsi diversa predicata et muta. Tamen intellectus tandem potest elicer conceptum simplicem quo intelligit ipsum absolute et separate ab alius.36

On this basis, we can construct demonstrations, the conclusions of which will include this simple concept as subject. To what discipline do they belong? To metaphysics, and this for several reasons. Buridan claims, contrary to Averroes, that God’s existence cannot be demonstrated by the physicist; only the metaphysician can demonstrate this, since only here is God viewed as first cause and first being. Moreover, according to Buridan, the term ‘being’ pertains properly to the field of metaphysics. Finally, the idea of a first cause does not belong to the physicist’s domain; the procedures of the physicist, in fact, lead to an infinite causal regress (see John Buridan 1588, II, q. 5, ff. XI35-XII36)

Thus, for John Buridan, discussion of the first principle — first cause and end of everything — is indeed reserved for metaphysics, the highest part of philosophy. Revealed theology is set aside, and a purely natural discourse about the first principle is at the same time possible and necessary.

With Buridan, metaphysics is actually natural theology (some centuries later it will be called “rational theology”). But it is to be noted that the major reason why metaphysics is natural theology is because it is not based on revelation. According to Scotus, philosophy, within its own self-defined limitations, makes possible the development of a “theology for us”

36 See Buridan’s Questiones de anima I, q. 6 in John Buridan 1516, f. 1111\textsuperscript{b}-v. In the Questiones in libros Metaphysicorum, he notes: “Unde quamvis non possimus intelligere substantia nisi mediantibus accidentibus sensilibus, tamen intellectus potest substantiam abstrahere ab accidentibus et cognoscere sive formare conceptum simplicem substantiae” (John Buridan 1588, II, q. 3, f. X35).
37 John Buridan 1588, II, q. 3, f. X35 (italics mine).
(theologia pro nobis). For Aquinas, natural theology attains the concept of a being of pure act, and this agrees well with the Mosaic revelation ("ego sum qui sum"). Indeed, the truth cannot be contradictory with the truth. On the other hand, knowledge of God that is a posteriori, starting from the sensible world, cannot completely grasp the divine essence, since this is reserved for the vision after death. Eschewing more radically the theological perspective, the Aristotelians of the faculty of arts developed a purely philosophical concept of the first principle, as first cause and ultimate end and as object of speculative happiness. Does that concept make revelation unnecessary? Certainly not. But that was not their intention. The point was to obtain through natural reason the ultimate philosophical concept required by the structure of the universe. These masters seem to think that this is possible, and consequently philosophy becomes autonomous in its own order.

This attitude and its effects will reappear in philosophical speculation into the seventeenth century, and we find some aspects of it in the thought of René Descartes (d. 1650).

4. DESCARTES, NATURAL THEOLOGY, AND GOD AS FIRST PRINCIPLE

Descartes asserts that he is not engaged in theology. He says this often and without any ambiguity. But it must be stressed that Descartes means by "theology" the domain of revealed truths, "which necessarily exceed our understanding". As a result of this, he rejects what he calls in the Entretien avec Burman "scholastic theology" (Descartes 1964-1976, vol. V, 176), i.e. the possibility of a scientific theology as it was conceived in the thirteenth century, in which the truths of faith were subordinated to demonstrative reasoning. Philosophy, on the other hand, is based on an enterprise of radical inquiry for Descartes. Philosophy takes nothing for granted before it has been examined in the light of reason; as a result, for Descartes the system of philosophical knowledge must be constructed on the basis of an order of cognition and not of being.

In this quest for truth, however, we encounter a particular, determined concept of God. Descartes' "first philosophy" is based upon the principle "ego sum", and goes on to show the existence of God. Thus, the two main subjects of the Meditationes de prima philosophia, i.e. the existence of God

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and the distinction between the soul and the body, “although they concern the faith, can be investigated by natural reason”, as we read in the *Notae in programmam* of 1647 (Descartes 1664-1976, vol. VII, 353).

Such a delimitation of the proper spheres of the theologian and of the philosopher leans towards the autonomy of philosophy, and this, as we have seen, was a tendency in medieval thought from the time of Aquinas through the late Middle Ages. The question of the nature of the first principle is surely very much transformed by Descartes, since he modifies the whole idea of “principle” – these are no longer principles of being; rather for Descartes they are principles in an epistemological program, determined according to the exercise of reason. Descartes uses his concept of God as the ultimate guarantee that we can know something beyond the fact that we exist. Despite this change from ontological to epistemological first principle, the role of God as first principle in philosophy is still a crucial one in Descartes’ thought. Cartesian innovations, fundamental in some respects, should not blind us to all the aspects of medieval and renaissance philosophy still at work. The division of competence between the theologian and the philosopher, which haunted the medieval masters of arts, but which also resulted in the distinction between several orders of argumentative validity in theologians from Scotus and on, in this context has the result of integrating into philosophy some categories or principles which could, at first glance, seem to concern primarily theology:\(^{30}\)

Pour ce qui est de votre question de Théologie, encore qu’elle passe la capacité de mon esprit, elle ne me semble pas toutefois hors de ma possession, pour ce qu’elle ne touche point à ce qui dépend de la révélation, ce que je nomme proprement théologie; mais elle est plutôt métaphysique et se doit examiner par la raison humaine.

We see here, clearly, a continuation of a “theology of the philosophers”, as Aquinas had formulated it. But Descartes never calls it this. Nor does he ever subordinate the study of these metaphysical subjects to a general ontology, so we cannot consider his doctrine a stage in a progression going from Scotus to Wolff by way of Suárez, which defined rational theology on the basis of a general ontology.\(^{31}\) Nevertheless, Descartes does put at the foundation of his philosophy a properly philosophical concept of God – this is a principle required for the solidity and coherence of his epistemological program. To consider God as first principle to be one of the objects of metaphysics is not particularly original. Originality arises here from the fact that this object is not founded upon a theory of being as being, in which God is most eminent being. God has a different conceptual

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\(^{31}\) On this, see Honnefelder’s contribution to this volume.
function in Descartes' system: specifically, God is necessary in order to
guarantee the veracity of our ideas.

As a result, the position of the concept of perfect being in metaphysics
is that of a properly philosophical concept of God, the God of the
philosophers, as Blaise Pascal (d. 1662) would say soon after,32 even
though this God does not contradict revealed truths. A God who is not
linked to one particular confession (this concept does not, e.g., rely on a
doctrine of the Word, which would involve the Trinity),33 but on some
philosophical principles such as God’s omnipotence, a notion of the
infinite, and the idea of causa sui, which is the great innovation of
the modern period when compared to the medieval period. This is a concept of
God that results from the need to found the veracity of our ideas and to
guarantee the natural order. This is the foundation required by physics and,
further, by all the wisdom that grounds or crowns, according to one’s point
of view, the philosophical enterprise. It is, more fundamentally, the proper
Cartesian manner of taking up the great challenge in the philosophical and
scientific context of that time: the presence of the infinite in the finite.

5. CONCLUSION

As a search for first causes and for first principles, the first philosophy, the
science investigated by Aristotle in the books of the Metaphysics, raises,
without having invented them, some philosophical questions that will recur
into the modern period. Are we forced to posit a unique principle or to
admit several principles? If the latter is the case, are we dealing with a
finite number, as forms of dualism (such as Manicheism) hold, or an
infinite number, as the Atomists had already proposed, introducing
plurality in the eleatic principle of being? Are there only natural principles,
which according to Aristotle means principles linked to movement, or do
we need to posit something immobile and eternal, i.e., with the
characteristics of the divine? If the principle is unique, is it finite or
infinite? And if the latter were the case, how can we conceive this unique
infinite principle? Scotus is the first to take up this last line of questioning,
but the investigation continues until the time of Descartes. Is the infinite
separate from the finite (i.e., as a creator is separate from the creation), or

non des philosophes et des savants…” (in Pascal 1663, 618).
meam philosophiam, ut ubique recipiat possit, vel etiam apud Turcas, ne ulli offendiculo
sim”. How could we speak here of “Christian philosophy”?
GOD AS FIRST PRINCIPLE

does it develop through the finite (as we see sometimes in the Renaissance, with e.g. Giordano Bruno, and as Hegel will claim)?

All these questions are properly philosophical questions. They concern the pure idea of the infinite, the absolute, the one and the many. But as early as the Hellenistic period they were confronted with the great monotheistic religions, and then with their theological elaborations in the Arabo-Islamic and in the Latin medieval world. New questions arose about the relation between Being and One, about the power of rational speculation and its limitations, about naming and what cannot be named.

God as first principle, whether unmoved mover of the Peripatetics or causa sui of the early modern philosophers, is surely not the God of Abraham and of Moses, who reveals himself and is not rationally constructed, who speaks to the heart and not to reason, who is beseeched in prayer before being examined systematically. The question, formulated by Pascal, of whether these two names refer to the same God has been present all along in the history of philosophy and theology. There is no one unique response to this question, since any answer depends on what we understand the philosophical enterprise to be, and medieval thinkers experimented with every possible variation on this theme.

No matter how one defines the limits of abstract thought, the concept of God as first principle is in any case representative of the meaning that a philosophical doctrine assigns to itself (or that another discipline assigns to philosophy). It reveals whether and to what extent we think of philosophy as autonomous, it reveals the role that metaphysics plays within philosophy, and it reveals the reach and limitations of rational thinking.

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