Is it not rather a waste of time to pay attention to Hegel’s treatment of the Middle Ages in his history of philosophy? One may at first view fear this. Hegel himself recognizes that he “traverses with seven league boots” a whole millennium, or at least six centuries, depending on the date chosen as marking the real beginning of medieval thought. His consideration is brief: the volume titled “The Philosophy of the Middle Ages” also includes the Renaissance, and he devotes a very modest number of pages to this rich and diverse period, in comparison to what was accorded Antiquity. Furthermore, a not insignificant fraction of these pages contains considerations on the spirit of the times that are really historical in character and, though not without relation to philosophy, nevertheless still further reduce the space given over to a strictly doctrinal analysis of medieval thought. Elsewhere, Hegel gives himself over to general considerations, which while certainly useful in achieving a synthetic appreciation of the period, are as he offers them insufficiently supported monographically and thus amount to dismissive judgments on the supposed stagnation of medieval thought. Hegel, one must at once admit, is at the very least dismissive of the views of authors today regarded as essential, and he totally ignores a good number of those who played a crucial role in medieval debates. Relying on the work of previous centuries as well as on historians of philosophy of his own time, his citations are almost all second-hand, and he really never gets rid of the prejudices about the Middle Ages, as much French as German, associated with the Enlightenment.

Given all this, what can Hegel have to say to us in this area that is interesting and original? Might it not be best to apply to what he said himself about the Middle Ages: “such an assemblage awakens in us no real interest, and cannot be reconsidered”? We will nevertheless reconsider the views of Hegel, attempting to derive instruction, if not on the Middle Ages, at least on the Hegelian vision of the history of philosophy. For if the Middle Ages is the time of the negative,
in the sense that the absolute is delivered over to the thinking of the understanding, is it not necessary to take time to dwell in the negative, if only to make explicit what modern philosophy presupposes? The Middle Ages, barbarous as this period may appear, can neither be reduced to a period of latency nor thought of as lying outside the transmission of past culture; it has a sense, be it contradictory, and presents a rationality in so far as it is a determinate figure in the development of the philosophical idea.

MEDIEVAL THOUGHT AND CHRISTIANITY

The primary characteristic of medieval philosophy, certainly its most fundamental for Hegel, is its essential connection with Christianity. This trait is, for Hegel, eminently positive; in it lies the greatness—albeit imperfectly realized—of medieval philosophy. I will return later to the qualifications to which this global characterization would today give rise. Medievalists, whatever their orientations or internal differences, no longer recognize in the idea of “Christian philosophy” a sufficient and all-encompassing definition of medieval thought.

Underlying this privileged connection between Christianity and medieval thought is the anticipation of the idea, today widely used, of translatio studiorum. Scientific and philosophical knowledge has undergone successive migrations from Greek antiquity to the Arabic world by way of Asia Minor, then from the Arabic-Moslem world to the Western world via Spain and Sicily. Unfortunately, Hegel considerably underestimates the contribution of the Arabic world, which he reduces to a purely external transmission of texts with no significant impact on conceptual content. He ignores both the properly scientific developments (algebra, astronomy, optics, medicine) and the original philosophical elaborations to which the effort of philosophical rationality to confront revelation in a new way gave rise, an effort taken up again, with new outlays of energy, in the Latin-speaking world. Missing the various conceptual innovations and the grand theological-metaphysical syntheses (Avicenna can claim but two lines), as well as the complexity of the philosophical commentaries on Aristotle, which were often influenced by Alexandrine philosophy, he has no idea of the richness and complexity of the Aristotelianism which the West received as material for its own elaborations at the end of the twelfth and during the thirteenth centuries.

Having thus reduced the Arabic Moslem world and the Hebraic world—evoked via Maimonides, one of the rare authors to be cited at length, and also used as a source for Arabic thought—to mere external vehicles of ancient or late-ancient doctrines, Hegel is able to characterize the Middle Ages by the fact that philosophy is immersed, no longer in the pagan world, but in the Christian. Christianity is the presentation of the absolute, of the spirit which reveals itself
as subject in and for itself, notably by the union of divine and human nature in Christ. It is because God is spirit that one is done with pagan naturalism, but also because the Christian religion become universal—not in the sense that it conquers the world but in the sense that it addresses itself to every man, to every individual, to every consciousness—requires philosophical consciousness which alone may think its truth: “To grasp and use the idea of Christianity, it is necessary to have recognized for itself the philosophical idea.” It is precisely to the medievals that Hegel assigns the historical task of recognizing the historical truth of Christianity and conducting it for the first time into a form that is thought.

It is true that the Neoplatonists (particularly Proclus) arrived at a very high level of speculation on the divine, and Hegel constantly gives them credit on this subject, but they did manage truly to think the rational in the Trinity and thought of the absolute with an admixture of mythical elements. It was the Fathers of the Church who had to elaborate the first body of doctrine. They were themselves nourished by philosophy, yet they belong more to the history of the Church (and thus to that of dogma) than to the history of philosophy.

This tissue of doctrine, as likewise the word of the Gospels, is thus given to the Western, Latin-speaking world as something that must be thought and brought to philosophical consciousness. What Hegel calls “scholastic philosophy” must confront the content that is proposed to it by the Christian religion with its dogmas and institutions. It contains, according to Hegel, “the basis of philosophy, that is the birth in man of the consciousness of truth, of the spirit in and for itself, as well as the necessity man feels to participate in that truth.”

The positive side of the thought labeled “scholastic” appears according to Hegel in an author such as Anselm of Canterbury. He belongs to the beginning, in the strict sense, of medieval philosophy. Hegel has medieval philosophy commence with Scotus Erigena, “but Scotus does not, strictly speaking, belong with the scholastics because his theology is not really based on biblical or doctrinal exegesis.” One may remark in passing that Hegel defines so-called scholastic philosophy not so much in terms of a real registration of doctrines but by a content or procedure, which leads him, for the centuries that follow, to leave to one side authors that do not fit into the following framework: “In the first place, the effort of the Scholastics was precisely to reconstruct the faith of the Christian Church on metaphysical foundations.”

Anselm fits this principal definition very well since he searches, famously, to use intelligence to understand faith; Hegel considers him as “the founder of scholastic theology.” “If on the one hand one can already discern in this founder the limits of that mode of thought which consists in applying formal logic to the understanding of the absolute, one may, on the other hand, retain and value the resolute will to think the divine instead of simply receiving it as a
given from religious revelation.” In this respect, Hegel opposes, to the tendencies of his time to value immediate knowledge, the will to demonstrate by reasoning what concerns the object of faith. Or better, by his proof of the existence of God, later called the “ontological proof”—Hegel employs this anachronistic designation—Anselm abandons the old cosmological and physico-theological proofs, which presuppose nature, in favor of a procedure which is at the outset located in the infinity of the divine essence, in so far as that essence implies being-there as a moment of its process. Whatever, from the Hegelian point of view, the limits of the Anselmian proof, it has the merit of considering the absolute movement of thought. More broadly, it reveals the essence of the “scholastic,” subjecting the divine to reflective thought. This is an ambivalent gesture, but it has the merit of at once showing the absolute (under the aspect of the divine) as an affair of thought.

It is by this standard that Hegel measures all later developments of medieval thought from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. Abelard, who does not appear in this account as logician but rather (without this being said explicitly) as the author of “Sic et Non,” helped introduce philosophy into theology. Peter Lombard with his Book of Sentences, commentary on which became obligatory for all theologians, lays down the bases for “learned (philosophical) theology.” The great philosophical-theological projects of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus are mentioned very briefly, the first having always “solid (speculative) metaphysical thinking which encompassed the whole of theology and philosophy.”

The great philosophical-theological projects of Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus are mentioned very briefly, the first having always “solid (speculative) metaphysical thinking which encompassed the whole of theology and philosophy.”

In consequence, numerous aspects of medieval thought are excluded from such a summary. (We will return to the place occupied by logic.) Attention to nature is not only ignored but denied outright. We know this is an important aspect of medieval thought, in the twelfth century with the School of Chartres, and more generally with the cosmo-physical theories inspired by both Genesis and the Timaeus, and then with the rediscovery of the libri naturales of Aristotle, which furnished the framework for all physical reflection from the epoch of Thomas Aquinas and Giles of Rome up to the dawn of the Classical Age, by way of the Parisian natural philosophy of the fourteenth century. It is this conjuring away which permits presentation, in a highly contestable manner, of the Renaissance as a “return to nature”! To say nothing of the domains of ethics and politics, even strictly metaphysical reflection and the conflicts that arose with the faculty of theology are minimized. Assuredly, certain condemnations are evoked (presented in a fashion not erroneous, but at least partial, as instances of
resistance to Aristotelianism), but the debates on the autonomy of philosophy are ignored. This is a significant lacuna. For philosophy can only appear here as the tool (which does not necessarily imply servility) of theology. This aspect certainly existed, notably in attempts to rationalize the givens of the faith and, conjointly, to mark the limits of this rationalization, but it cannot do justice to the complexity of the debates and what was at stake in them.

The supposed merit of the medievals is, accordingly, more in the application of an already elaborated philosophy to a highly speculative content than in its own conceptual elaboration. That is why the form of this philosophy can only present itself as a degraded version of Aristotelianism. “Aristotelian philosophy . . . predominates,” 19 but in a form infinitely less speculative than the thought of Aristotle himself: “What is properly speculative in Aristotle remains secondary.” 20

This evaluation explains the high value, contrastively, accorded to Neoplatonism and mysticism, which on this occasion are not distinguished from one another. Since the dominant Aristotelian philosophy entails a finitization and trivialization of what is in itself and for itself infinite and spiritual, it is to Neoplatonism, in so far as it carries an elevated sense of the absolute, and to mysticism, in so far as it is opposed to a superficial apprehension of the divine, that we must look for the maintenance of a subterranean speculative current: “they have . . . continued to philosophize in the manner of the Neoplatonists, as Scotus Erigena has already done. One finds in them an authentic philosophizing that is also called Mysticism.” 21 Yet here again Hegel is dismissive. Not only does he fail to suggest any trace of the complex relations between Aristotelianism and Alexandrine Neoplatonism that fashioned the version of Aristotelianism that the medievals inherited via the Arabic commentators, but he furnishes only a brief, and heterogeneous, list of authors, amongst whom, for example, even Meister Eckhart does not figure. It is clear once more that for Hegel what is essential in the “scholastic” is simply a combination of Christian content and Aristotelian form.

METAPHYSICS OF UNDERSTANDING AND FORMAL DIALECTIC

In truth, the principal defect of “scholastic” thought is its formalism. In this criticism, one again encounters a constant feature of Hegelian thinking. But, at the same time, one becomes aware that the preoccupation of Hegel in these pages is more to characterize an attitude of thought with respect to objectivity—of which assuredly the Medievals are an emblematic manifestation—than to recover the facts of the history of thought.
Hegel, paradoxically, little emphasizes the developments in logic specific to the medievals—which in our time is recognized as one of the domains where they were most inventive—at the same time that he underlines the formal character of their “dialectic.” The one domain that he discusses in greater detail, which belongs in part to logic and in part to metaphysics, is that which concerns the status of universals. Taking over sources that go back to the late Middle Ages, an epoch when this quarrel had assumed a dramatic, institutional form, Hegel doubtless contributed to the establishment of a historiography that, with Victor Cousin in France, made “the problem of universals” the privileged site of the philosophy of the Middle Ages.

Hegel retraces the opposition of realism and nominalism, which “preoccupied scholastic philosophy for many centuries, and did it much honor.”22 The principal stages discussed are the twelfth and the fourteenth centuries, in fact the two periods most important in terms of the history of logic of the problem, in contrast to the more metaphysical problematic of Avicenna and Albert the Great. For the twelfth century, the principal protagonists mentioned are Roscelin de Compiègne and Gauthier de Mortagne, Abelard getting but a line in this discussion.23 But Hegel recognizes that “the history of the Realists and the Nominalists is . . . very obscure.”24 Then, after having made an allusion to the realism of Thomas Aquinas and to Scotus, Hegel passes to the second period with William of Ockham: “It is he who, after Abelard, put this question back on the agenda.”25 His position is examined with considerable precision. John Buridan, in contrast, though described in passing as “nominalist,” is brought up, via a mistaken reading of the apocryphal anecdote of the ass, as an example of a supposed determinist.

One must then ask oneself why Hegel paid so much attention to this episode. He himself provides the answer in constantly rewriting the problem in terms of subjective representation. These terms are evidently inadequate for medieval thought: one may certainly speak (in senses that will always need to be made more precise) of representation, as much for sensible or intelligible images (species) as for the Ockhamist mental language, but it is difficult to see in the problem of the universal, either in its strictly logical aspects (posed in terms of the meanings of words or conceptual signs) or in its noetic-metaphysical aspects (centering on the idea of a common nature), a conceptuality or, a fortiori, a vocabulary of subjectivity. Nevertheless this is how Hegel understands it: “The question is hence the following: are these universals something real in themselves and of themselves outside the thinking subject and are they independent of the singular existing thing, or is the universal only nominal, only in subjective representation . . . ?”26 The reason for the privilege Hegel accords this question is
henceforth clear: this conflict, as it is replayed in the late Middle Ages, constitutes the beginnings of thinking about representation and hence, for Hegel, of the thinking subject, which can flourish only in “Modern Times.” “The determination of the universal which comes from the Scholastics is extremely important, and significant, for the culture of the modern world. The universal is the one, not abstract but represented, thought as comprehending all in itself.”

The Medieval period is not thus a total stagnation of the philosophical idea, and something significant for the spirit may emerge from it.

Outside this problematic emergence of subjectivity, the essence of the logical step taken by the “scholastics” consists in the systematic application of Aristotelian logic, reduced to its most mechanical aspects. “That the knowledge of Aristotle and particularly of his logic came to be possessed was a point of great importance. . . . Aristotelian logic permitted a great increase in dialectical subtlety and the extreme development of the forms of understanding it has to do with.” Even if the passage on “formal dialectic” is quite brief, it contains an appreciation that is constant in Hegel. Noting the (incontestable) importance given to logic by the Medievals, Hegel acknowledges a “dialectical interest,” but “of an entirely formal nature.” The term “dialectic” is doubtless not chosen here by chance. We know that at the earliest period of the Middle Ages, when the work of the Stoics was being continued, the terms dialectic and logic were synonyms. But this practice of interchangeability no longer obtains in the period of the universities with which Hegel is mainly concerned; dialectic reverts to its Aristotelian meaning, which here is inadequate.

If for his own purposes Hegel assimilates medieval logic to dialectic, this is obviously not in the Aristotelian sense of a probable syllogism, but doubtless—and I will come back to this—to underline the negatively rational side of this logical thinking. At the origin of this development, he once again reveals the ambition to treat rationally the highest contents of thought; that is why “originally the spiritual was . . . at the basis of this development.” Later, logical technique was developed for its own sake. Such was indeed the evolution of medieval thought. The arts of language, stimulated at first by theological difficulties, were cultivated for themselves to a very high point, not always in a unilateral derivation from the initial preoccupations, but in a constant interplay between logic (and grammar) on the one hand and theology on the other. It is true that logic never lost its status as an instrument, whether this was for theology or natural philosophy; it nevertheless developed in its formal aspects which had to do with the syllogism, but above all with a general theory of inferences, with a theory of “obligations” (that is to say, constraints tied to the rules of the inter-discursive situation), with temporal, modal, and deontic logic, etc. If Hegel does not discuss these developments (as he evidently does not), he will doubtless only have seen the development stimulated by a logic of understanding.
Already, he judges that “to philosophize consists of rule-governed, syllogistic ratiocination.”\textsuperscript{31} It is this formal character, as much as the presupposition of revealed givens or concern with another world, which explains, according to Hegel, why “in this scholastic activity, thinking goes about its business entirely cut off from all reference to effective reality, to any experience.”\textsuperscript{32}

It is in truth the development of disputation \textit{pro et contra} that seems to represent for Hegel the height of formalism. “The general form of scholastic philosophy thus consists in posing a proposition, give the objections to which it raises, and then refute them by counter-syllogisms and distinctions.”\textsuperscript{33} But to the extent that this method receives its content from theology, what remains in the possession of philosophy is “only the laws of thinking and abstractions.” Even Anselm is guilty of this original scholastic sin; despite the speculative ambition of his argument, concept and being do not appear any less in opposition, which exposed the argument to the criticism of Kant (here validated by Hegel): “This logical proof of Anselm has for defect to be made according to the formal logical mode.”\textsuperscript{34} There is in Anselm no real conception of the unity of thinking and being in the infinite.

This logical formalism is thus tied to a thought of the finite (or worse, a finite thought of the infinite), in brief, to what Hegel presents as a metaphysics of the understanding.

\textit{A Metaphysics of the Understanding}

“Philosophy falls to the level of a metaphysics of understanding and of formal dialectic.” This language of decline is explained above all with respect to the greatness of the object considered, that is, absolute essence. In other places (brief reference having been made at the beginning to the relatively positive value of medieval thought), this metaphysical argumentation is valued as an attempt at systematization; it is even contrasted with the evangelical banality of Modern Times. By this union, albeit imperfect, Hegel writes, are born monsters of theory in both theology and philosophy: “the theology of the Middle Ages is at a much higher level than that of Modern Times.”\textsuperscript{35}

What Hegel denounces, taking up again the most caricatural anecdotes offered by eighteenth-century histories of philosophy, is the application of finite determinations and determinations taken from the human or natural world to the divinity. Could God become incarnate in a woman? In an ass? In a pumpkin? After the resurrection of the body, will there be individuals of both sexes? Will some be fat and others skinny? And so forth. The Medievals, especially at the end of the Middle Ages, could really take pleasure in the search for paradoxical examples in order to explore the limits of formal reasoning, when not simply multiplying imaginary examples in “counterfactual” style. Additionally, one
cannot exclude, with men trained in school exercises of lesson, question, and disputation, the passion for logical virtuosity cultivated for its own sake.\textsuperscript{36} But they also took themselves to be, through their logical reasoning, exploring the structure of the physical world as well as the omnipotent divine. Hegel himself remarks, moreover, that this reasoning is often tied to the problems of power, wisdom, and predestination.

At bottom what Hegel objects to is the application of sensible, and as such finite, determinations to subjects concerning the infinite. It is in this sense a metaphysics of the understanding, and not of truly rational thinking; thus Hegel makes certain very harsh judgments on “a barbarous philosophy of the understanding.”\textsuperscript{37} “What is scholasticism but the understanding caught up in the asperities of the Nordic-Germanic nature?”\textsuperscript{38}

We should also remember, in this connection, the ambivalence of Hegel’s judgments on the understanding in general and on the metaphysics of the understanding in particular. In the addition to Article 28 of the Encyclopedia, Hegel objects to the presupposition of ancient metaphysics that was finite thinking. His criticism extends to much more than medieval or “scholastic” philosophy; it includes among its targets the metaphysics that Kant called dogmatic, but which we know today is not without filiation with medieval, and notably Scotist, metaphysics. Hegel refers, among other things, to the ontological proof: “this metaphysics moves within the determinations-of-thought whose limit is taken as fixed and is not in turn negated. One asks oneself the question, for example, ‘Has God a being-there?’ and this \textit{being-there} is considered as something purely positive, as something ultimate and excellent. But we will later see that \textit{being-there} is no way something simply positive but is a determination too lowly for the Idea and not worthy of God.”\textsuperscript{39} Finiteness of determinations, mutual exteriority of these determinations and their object: such are the principal characteristics of such a metaphysics of the understanding.

This is indeed what Hegel discovers in medieval thought: “The philosophy of Aristotle falls into . . . the hands of this understanding which the spirit has abandoned. But this is a sword that cuts two ways; there is a clear and determined understanding which is at the same time speculative concept: the abstract determinations of the understanding, taken in isolation, are in themselves inconsistent. They are transitory and dialectical, and have truth only in their interconnection.”\textsuperscript{40} We have seen that, according to Hegel, the dominant current of medieval philosophy—or, more precisely, what Hegel was familiar with and retained—assuredly falls on the bad side of the cut: on the side of the most arid negativity, in itself the carrier of conceptual development, no doubt, but terribly eviscerated. One will nevertheless recall the rehabilitation of metaphysics to which Hegel devoted himself, not solely in setting the science of logic in the place of ancient metaphysics,\textsuperscript{41} but in affirming, on the side of Newton, that
“man in so much as he is a thinking being is born a metaphysician.”42 If in this text Hegel evokes a metaphysics of another nature than that of the abstract determinations of the understanding, the reuse of this designation emphasizes the rational character of this moment of negative reflection, of splitting, of the clarification of determinations. May we not henceforth judge that it is just here that, from the point of view of absolute spirit, the medieval moment in the deployment of the idea of philosophy is begun?

CONCLUSION

We have not neglected to indicate in passing the deficiencies and, indeed, the very reductive vision that informs Hegel’s account of the philosophy of the Middle Ages. It is not useful to go further in this direction, if not to characterize the general sense of the Hegelian presentation, including what may today appear unacceptable. Hegel evidently depended on histories of philosophy (that the Michelet edition has consigned to notes, reproduced in the French version): Tennemann, in the first place, but also Brucker, and some others. But above all Hegel remained in thrall to the prejudices of the Aufklärung concerning medieval thought. Building on the rejection, by certain humanists, of both medieval logic and science, the Lumières, both French and German, for reasons obviously linked to their struggle against the Ancien Régime and to their conception of the progress of Reason, reduced the Middle Ages to a form of thinking essentially theological and based on formal ratiocination. Hegel retained this vision. He is so certain he can thus define it that, against all evidence, he accentuates its unity to retain no more than a few essential traits: “The name scholastic philosophy is in truth very indeterminate, designating more a general manner than a unique system.”43 One should, accordingly, not be surprised by the poverty of historical detail or the failure to take into account diversity: this is not what Hegel is trying to achieve. Further, he remains, at least according to P. Garniron,44 below the level of his immediate sources, of Tennemann notably, in taking account of the originality of this or that thinker. Presuming the fundamentally stationary character of medieval thought brings into relief some of the systematic features he ascribes to it. In the same way, presupposing the fundamentally theological content of its object, he deliberately ignores the characteristically philosophical efforts at rationalization in numerous other domains. But these limitations are not what constitute the originality of the Hegelian treatment.

Despite all his criticisms, Hegel persists in assigning the Middle Ages a place in the history of the spirit. This place, with all its ambivalence, is that of otherness or alterity, of particularity, of the negative in its formal aspect. Knowing that the absolute never gives itself all at once, that the moment of reflection is where its essential determinations are deployed, one suspects that, despite all the
formalism of the understanding, the medieval period is not devoid of rationality. It allowed the highest content to achieve the first form of its rationalization. If it is true that the Middle Ages is a time of splitting—between Emperor and Pope, between this world deprived of reality and value and the world beyond where alone truth dwells, between philosophy and theology—and if the subject of reflection (the intelligible world of the Christian religion) remains presupposed rather than placed conceptually, it is still no less true that this effort of conceptualization is for Hegel indicative of the power of reflective thought.

Finally, whether it has to do with what is valued or decried, the specifically Hegelian vision of the Middle Ages (and, in complement, that of the Renaissance as renaissance of the arts and sciences, and above all the return to nature) is fundamentally determined by his conception of Modern Times. Concerned to define this, notably the Cartesian moment, as the thought of subjectivity (this is not the place to evaluate that characterization), Hegel is led to overemphasize greatly its rupture with what went before. If the subject is for itself in reflecting its other in itself, medieval thought can be defined, in contrast, as thought which presupposes the absolute as content. That is why philosophy appears, according to Hegel, as a form which presupposes its own content, and in the case of the Middle Ages, renders it “earth-bound,” in reducing it to finite, indeed sensible, determinations.

Redefining in more complex fashion the Cartesian moment and in particular its relations with the periods of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, as undertaken in the majority of contemporary studies, the diversity of medieval philosophy will surge to the fore under novel illumination.

NOTES

2 Ibid., 1122.
3 “In theological form, one can say that the Middle Ages is, in general, the reign of the Son and not that of the Spirit” (1058).
4 “We may thus say of the Arabs that their philosophy does not constitute a specific stage in the development of philosophy” (124).
5 “Naturalness is just that in which man cannot remain. . . . Initial naturalness must be superceded. Here we have the general idea of Christianity” (999). See also Hegel, *Leçons sur la philosophie de la religion*, trans. J. Gibelin (Paris: Vrin, 1954): “La religion absolue.”
6 *Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie*, vol. 5, 999.
7 See also Hegel, *Leçons sur la philosophie de la religion*, vol. 4, part 3: “Les Néoplatoniciens.” “This ‘third degree’ is the form taken by philosophy that finds itself in the most intimate connection with Christianity and the revolution that has brought to the world” (811). On Proclus and the Trinity, see 923–42.
8 *Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie*, vol. 5, 1041.
9 Ibid., 1067.
10 Ibid., 1069.
11 Ibid., 1070.
12 Ibid., 1072.
13 Ibid., 1072.
15 Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie, vol. 5, 1082.
16 Oddly, Hegel mentions the Summa Theologica among the specific sources for medieval philosophy (Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie, vol. 5, 1057), but he devotes only a page to the Angelic Doctor, taken from Tennemann!
17 Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie, vol. 5, 1085.
18 Ibid., 1093.
19 Ibid., 1060.
20 Ibid., 1095. Hegel accorded Aristotle high praise: “There is no one who has as much scope and speculative spirit” (Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie, vol. 3, 499); “In reality, Aristotle is superior to Plato in speculative profundity in that he has known speculation, the most rigorous idealism, and that he affirms it within the most ample empirical development” (ibid., vol. 3, 500).
21 Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie, vol. 5, 1116.
22 Ibid., 1096, emphasis added.
23 It is true that Hegel considers him earlier, as I have indicated, but not on the topic of universals.
24 Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie, vol. 5, 1099.
25 Ibid., 1104.
26 Ibid., 1097.
27 Ibid., 1107.
28 Ibid., 1095.
29 Ibid., 1110.
30 Ibid., 1111.
31 Ibid., 1061.
32 Ibid., 1059. It is pointless to emphasize once again the extent to which such a judgment rests on an impoverished vision of medieval philosophy. I content myself with citing this surprising statement: “What is for knowledge the unique point of departure, the consideration of nature, does not exist here” (1064).
33 Ibid., 1059.
34 Ibid., 1075.
35 Ibid., 1079.
36 “These researches degenerated into a passion for formal, and entirely empty, disputation” (1112).
37 Ibid., 1122.
38 Ibid., 1122.
40 Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie, vol. 5, 1127.
42 Enc., Addition to § 98, 531. In this text, Hegel, without challenging metaphysics, tries to free it from the understanding.
43 Leçons sur l’histoire de la philosophie, vol. 5, 1056.